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THE ENVIRONMENTAL COORDINATION
PROCEDURES ACT OF 1973, OR
ECPA! ECPA! RAH, RAH, RAH!
Charles E. Corker* and Richard W. Elliott**
The Washington Legislature in 1973 created procedures, optional
with a project developer, for centralized, coordinated processing
of the permit applications which state and local government now
require for a developer's use of air, water and land. The Act is
entitled the Environmental Coordination Procedures Act of 1973
(ECPA),' which does not become operative until January 1, 1974.2
Since its procedures are optional with a project's developer, there is no
absolute certainty at the date this article is released for publication 3
that ECPA's coordination will ever be utilized.
The cheers we mean, but the occasion is like that when the home
team's quarterback has run 90 yards and tripped on his shoe laces just
short of the goal line on the next to the last play in a game with the
opponents three points ahead. The cheers are for the performance
completed, but even more for the next play which must succeed if the
90-yard run is to be more than exercise. We do not now propose firing
the coach because he didn't check the shoe laces.
Cheers are deserved for a spectacular achievement by which envi-
ronmentalists and development-oriented opponents supported enact-
ment of ECPA.4 Cheers are needed if the possibilities of ECPA are to
be achieved.
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; A.B., Stanford, 194 1; LL.B., Har-
vard Law School, 1946.
** Third-year law student, University of Washington; B.A., Oregon State,
1964; M.S. Engineering, University of Washington, 1970.
1. Ch. 185, [1973] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.; WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.62 (Supp.
1973).
2. "This 1973 act shall take effect on January 1, 1974, except that the department
[of Ecology], state agencies and local governments are authorized to take such steps as
are necessary prior to that date to insure that this 1973 act is properly impleminted on
its effective date." ECPA § 18, WASH. REv. CODE § 90.62.906.
3. Except for addition of citations, this article was released for publication on Oc-
tober 8, 1973, and speaks as of that date.
4. A Seattle Post-Intelligencer story on May 18, 1973, was headlined: "1973 Legis-
lature Commended by Environmental Lobbyists." The Legislature is praised for not
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ECPA won support of opposed groups because both recognized a
common enemy. Both were deeply threatened by bureaucracy and red
tape to the point of accepting coordination. The developer today is
confronted by a bewildering array of laws whenever he proposes a
project 5 which may affect air, water, and land resources of the state.6
Most such laws have a potential to protect people and their environ-
ment, but their complexity and multiplicity bewilder environmen-
talists who seek to bring developers to book. The year 1973 appears
to be the date when both antagonists got tired of rushing off in search
of the arena for the day's jousting.
ECPA's grand design is to provide for centralized and coordinated
processing of all the permit applications which a developer may re-
quire for a project. It exposes the entire project to a public hearing at
which all cognizant state agencies will be represented, before action is
taken on any state permit application. It includes consolidated admin-
istrative and judicial review. It leaves each state agency issuing per-
mits with the same substantive powers it now has, but promises expe-
dited decisions with the Department of Ecology (Ecology) as expe-
diter.
enacting a Highway Department bill to exempt that Department from the requirement
of environmental impact statements under the State Environmental Policy Act. ECPA
is praised as an Act which "sets up a system for clearance of permits for develop-
ments." Id. at A9, cols. 2-8.
The Washington Environmental Council's undated Legislative Wrapup published at
the end of the First Extraordinary Session of 1973 emphasizes that a major part of the
1973 environmental successes were in the fact that "we didn't lose." Two "very impor-
tant bills" enacted were tax exemption for nature conservancy land and "an environ-
mental coordination act." The latter will "provide not only for more efficient handling
of the permit-granting process but also establishes a hearings procedure and a chance for
members of the public to appeal the outcome of the hearings if they disagree." Wash-
ington Environmental Council, Legislative Wrapup (1973). This is not accurate with
respect to appeals, unless the reference is to a possibility that ECPA will give the public
greater knowledge of the occasion for an appeal. Under ECPA, review is in fact nar-
rower than under proceedings not involving ECPA. See Part II-D infra.
5. ECPA § 2(7), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.020(7), defines "project" as follows:
[A] ny new activity or any expansion of or addition to an existing activity, fixed in
location, for which permits are required from the department of ecology and one or
more other state agencies prior to construction or operation, including but not lim-
ited to industrial and commercial operations and developments.
See Part Il-C infra for discussion of a further provision which removes from this defini-
tion proprietary interests of the state, principally those administered by the Department
of Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Public Lands.
6. See Appendix A infra, a letter from Mr. Charles B. Roe, Jr., Senior Assistant
Attorney General for the Department of Ecology, to Professor Charles E. Corker, which
contains a nonexclusive list of agency permits which Mr. Roe believes will be covered
by ECPA.
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The question now is, will it work? At this moment, the mechanism
for ECPA's launching is still under construction. Ecology and the
Washington Attorney General's staff are engaged in the formidable
task of devising regulations, forms and procedures that will determine
how the attempt to make it work will proceed. ECPA already has sur-
vived a prenatal crisis. The Legislature directed Ecology to advise
both Houses by June 30, 1973, how much ECPA will cost before a
planned "mini-session" of the Legislature met in September;7 Ecology
responded with a figure of $794,533 for a biennium. The Legislature
appropriated $500,000 instead,8 and Ecology is trying to make do.
The significance cf the historic detente between environmentalists
and developers is not clear. Dr. Pangloss surely would conclude that
both these groups have, at long last, awakened to an important and
deeply fundamental truth. Defending the environment and develop-
ment are not objectives in a zero-sum game in which one side can win
only what the other side loses. With Dr. Pangloss, we believe the game
is not zero-sum, but we are not totally optimistic that neither side has
been overreached, nor that ECPA as enacted will not disappoint al-
most everyone. Changes must be made.
ECPA has flaws which should be apparent whether one wears a
white hat, a black hat or no hat at all. Fortunately, these flaws are
readily correctable by the Legislature. Some may be mitigated by
regulations. The flaws we explore in Part II, following a summary in
Part I of how ECPA operates. The important contribution we hope to
have made is in Part III. While it appears that the Legislature may not
have fully perceived it, ECPA offers the possibility of a mutually ben-
eficial coordination with the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971
(SEPA).9 Realization of that possibility is a necessity if SEPA and
7. ECPA § 20 (uncodified). Appendix B infra, excerpt from Ecology's report to
the Legislature, shows that $794,533 will be required in the 1974-75 biennium and
details how Ecology proposed to spend this money.
8. Ch. 39, § 5, [1973] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. (effective Sept. 26, 1973).
Requiring a report of costs before ECPA is launched is wise. Washington's Water
Rights Registration Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.14 (Supp. 1972), was originally en-
acted in 1967, but its registration provisions were formally declared inoperative by duly
promulgated regulation after the Director of Water Resources ascertained that $225,000
needed to administer registration was unavailable, or better spent on other depart-
mental programs. See Corker & Roe, Washington's New Water Rights Law-Improve-
ments Needed, 44 WASH. L. REV. 84, 87-100 (1968). One biennium was lost in getting
the registration program under way by a modified version charging water right claim-
ants $2 for registration. See WASH. REV. CODE §'90.14.061 (Stipp. 1972).
9. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 43.21C (Supp. 1972).
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ECPA are to avoid becoming statutory relics of a passing environmen-
talist fad.
I. ECPA'S PLAN OF OPERATION-TWO PROBLEMS
AND A SINGLE SOLUTION
At the outset, ECPA identifies two problems. First, the developer is
faced with a myriad of laws, hard to identify, and costly to satisfy, in
launching his project.10 Second, the defenders of the environment
have an equally hard time identifying the laws with which a developer
can be forced to comply, and making sure that the public's interest is
adequately protected in what is usually a cluster of low visibility gov-
ernmental decisions.II
Unlike Washington's Thermal Power Plant Siting Act,' 2 which cre-
ated an Evaluation Council with power to recommend a final decision
to the Governor,' 3 ECPA leaves all agency powers with the agency
which now has them. The ECPA concept is imaginative, its execution
10. It is the sense of the legislature that the heavy burdens placed upon persons
proposing to undertake certain types of projects in this state through require-
ments to obtain numerous permits and related documents from various state and
local agencies are undesirable and should be alleviated.
ECPA § l(I), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.010(1).
11. The Legislature further finds that present methods for obtaining public
views in relation to applications to state and local agencies pertaining to these
projects are cumbersome and place undue hardships on members of the public
thereby thwarting the public's ability to present such views.
Id. § 1(2), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.010(2).
12. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 80.50 (Supp. 1972).
13. Id. § 80.50.030 lists 15 state agencies to be represented on the "thermal power
plant site evaluation council." Certification of a site by the Governor pursuant to
recommendation of this council "shall bind the state or any of its departments..
agencies, divisions, bureaus, commissions or boards as to the approval of the site and
the construction and operation of the proposed thermal power plant and any asso-
ciated transmission lines." Id. § 80.50.120(1). The Governor is apparently limited to a
choice to "approve or reject the application for certification" and his choice is "final as
to that application." Id. § 80.50.100.
The Thermal Power Plant Siting Act, like ECPA, captured environmental en-
thusiasm, but we are not sure why. If, after the state has been bound by the Gov-
ernor's certification, the state learns of previously unsuspected hazards from power
plants, or that power can now be cheaply transmitted without devoting thousands of
acres to surface transmission lines, the state will nevertheless be irrevocably "bound"
-unless the Legislature is somehow then able to unwind the whole affair. Federal
preemption of Chapter 80.50-only a possible threat to environmentalist advocates in
1970-may be a welcome happening before 1980. For more sympathetic views of the
Thermal Power Plant Siting Act, see Symposium, The Location of Electricity Gen-
erating Facilities, 47 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1970).
ECPA § 3, WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.030, makes ECPA inapplicable to thermal
power siting matters controlled by WASH. REV. CODE ch. 80.50.
466
Environmental Coordination Procedures
complicated. We can best describe ECPA's operation by the following
hypothetical case.
General Widgets, Inc., (GW) proposes to build a widget processing
plant. It needs a zoning permit from local government, numerous per-
mits from state agencies and a few permits from the United States. 14
GW need not follow the procedures which ECPA offers; it may apply
for all needed permits under present law and present procedures.
GW may, however, choose to follow coordinated procedures of ECPA,
and if GW does so, this is what happens. Appendix C is a diagram
which may assist both in following the detailed description of ECPA
which follows in this Part I, and the proposed modification in Part III.
STEP 1. Certification by Local Government
Having decided to utilize the coordinated procedures of ECPA, 15
GW must first secure a certification from local government 16 that its
project "is in compliance with all zoning ordinances, and associated
comprehensive plans,"' 7 or that the certifying local government has
no such ordinances or plans with which GW must comply. ECPA di-
rects local governments to rule on GW's applications for this certifica-
tion "expeditiously."' 8 We expect that Ecology will give some content
to what "expeditiously" means in its forthcoming regulations.' 9
14. Although ECPA does not inventory the state laws it seeks to coordinate, the
Act does direct Ecology to make the inventory, and that operation is still in progress.
Appendix A is a letter and enclosures from Mr. Charles B. Roe, Jr., Senior Assist-
ant Attorney General for the Department of Ecology. Mr. Roe, a major draftsman of
ECPA, lists representative statutes subject to coordination.
In addition, however, ECPA proposes to do something about complications of both
local and federal laws. Ecology is to establish "permit requirements information cen-
ters" in Olympia and "in all of its regional offices." ECPA § 12(1), WASH. REV. CODE
§ 90.62.120(1).
15. ECPA § l(2)(a), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.010(2)(a), lists as its first pur-
pose to provide "an optional procedure" to assist those who must obtain state permits
for a project to use the state's air, land, or water resources. This precludes any possi-
bility that "may" means "shall" or "must" in ECPA § 4(l), WASH. REV. CODE §
90.62.040(1), which says that "Any person proposing a project may submit a master
application to the department [of Ecology) requesting the issuance of all permits
necessary prior to the construction and operation of the project in the state of
Washington."
16. "'Local government' means a county, city or town." ECPA § 2(3), WASH.
REV. CODE § 90.62.020(3).
17. Id. § 10(1), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.100(1).
18. Id.
19. "The department [of Ecology] shall adopt such rules as are appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this chapter." Id. § 11(1), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.110(l).
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Consequences of this local government certification are two. First,
the certifying local government is forbidden to change its zoning ordi-
nances to affect the proposed project until all further ECPA proceed-
ings including appeals have been completed. 20 Second, no environ-
mental impact statement is required on the occasion of the local gov-
ernment's certification. 21 This is contrary to three recent decisions of
the Washington Supreme Court; 22 the law will still require an impact
statement in all appropriate cases if the applicant does not proceed
under ECPA.23
STEP 2. Completion of the Master Application
GW must submit to Ecology, on a form to be furnished by Ecol-
ogy, a master application accompanied by the certifications of local
The local government does not share this rulemaking mandate. "State agencies and
local governments shall cooperate fully in the preparation implementation [sic] of
rules authorized under this section and in otherwise carrying out the provisions of
this chapter." Id. § 11(2), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.110(2). Ruling on application
for certification must take place "expeditiously to insure the purposes of this chapter
are accomplished fully." Id. § 10(1), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.100(1). Ecology is
the only coordinator and expediter. Rules should include specification of remedies and
sanctions for failure to act "expeditiously." Should a failure of local government be
corrected by Ecology, by the developer, or by an organizational defender of the en-
vironment? If a municipality certifies compliance erroneously, will Ecology proceed as
ECPA directs despite a pending judicial challenge to the certification?
20. "Upon certification, the local government may not change such zoning ordi-
nances so as to affect the proposed project until the procedures of this chapter. in-
cluding any board or court reviews are completed." ECPA § 10(1), WASH. REV. CODE
§ 90.62.100(1).
21. "The provisions of the state environmental policy act relating to the prepara-
tion of detailed impact statements shall not be applicable to the action approving or
denying certifications [by local governments] authorized in this section." Id. (emphasis
added). The reference is to SEPA § 3(c), WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(c), a
direction to all branches of state and local government to include in "every recom-
mendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major actions significantly
affecting the quality of the environment, a detailed statement by the responsible offi-
cial on . . . (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action .... " (emphasis
added). The law makes no provision for environmental impact statements which are
not "detailed."
22. Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wn. 2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973); Eastlake Com-
munity Council v. Roanoke Associates, 82 Wn. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973);
Stempel v. Dep't of Water Resources, 82 Wn. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973). See also
Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140
(1973).
23. The four decisions in the preceding footnote are arguably wrong, because they
overlooked the policy implications of ECPA § 10. Our conclusion, however, is to the
contrary. In Part I1-B and Part III infra we state our view that both consequences of
ECPA § 10 are unfortunate, that either § 10 must be modified or SEPA should be
repealed as a bad job.
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government described in STEP 1. This master application must con-
tain "precise information as to the location of the project" and a de-
scription of "the nature of the project including.., any uses of, inter-
ferences with, natural resources contemplated. 24 Assessment of how
formidable GW's STEP 2 task may be is impossible until the form and
regulations have been devised. 25 If ECPA is to succeed, however, the
master application must be carefully prepared. Only a "properly com-
pleted master application" authorizes Ecology to take STEP 3.26
STEP 3. Immediate Written Notification by Ecology to all
State Agencies With "possible interest"
Upon receipt of a properly completed master application (STEP 2),
accompanied by local government certification that the project com-
plies with zoning laws and master plans, or certification that no such
laws exist (STEP 1), Ecology must "immediately notify" all state
agencies which have a possible interest in the project that an applica-
tion has been received.27 A copy of the master application must ac-
company this notice. If the master application serves its purpose, we
envisage a document in some cases weighing several pounds. Many
copies often will be required for distribution to state agencies under
STEP 3.28
STEP 4. State Agency Response to Master Application
The agencies notified by Ecology that GW has submitted a master
24. ECPA § 4(l), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.040(1).
25. The Legislature directs Ecology to adopt rules for "Master application pro-
cedures under section 4(1) and (2) of this 1973 act." Id. § 1 l(l)(a), WASH. REv.
CODE § 90.62.110(l)(a).
26. Id. § 4(2), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.040(2).
27. Id.
28. Regulations may cut the duplicating costs: (1) The master application form
may invite attachments and appendices, which are not part of the form for this pur-
pose, but which may be supplied to a sister agency of Ecology which thinks they are
important; (2) a sister agency may delegate an Ecology employee as the sister
agency's representative to inspect and copy only relevant portions of the master appli-
cation. Further, if the information "in readily understandable form" which Ecology
is to prepare for public information under ECPA § 12 (see note 14 supra) serves its
purpose, Ecology may develop some expertise in narrowing its selection of the
agencies with a "possible interest" which must be notified and sent copies of the mas-
ter application. "[P] ossible interest" arises only when an agency has "a permit pro-
gram under [its] jurisdiction." ECPA § 4(2), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.040(2).
Ecology should be able to understand the ambit of those programs.
469
Washington Law Review Vol. 49: 463, 1974
application (STEP 3) must advise Ecology within whatever time
Ecology permits-but "not exceeding fifteen days from receipt"-
whether the agency has an interest.2 9 If the notified agency says it has
no interest, or if it says nothing, it is precluded thereafter from en-
forcing its regulatory law against GW, unless the fault is attributable
to lack of information or misinformation in GW's master application. 30
If a notified agency says that it has an interest, it may also advise
Ecology that it regards a public hearing to be of no value, a position
that becomes important 31 only if Ecology and all interested sister
agencies concur.32
If an agency is in doubt-or if it is unable to study the master ap-
plication within the maximum 15 days permitted-it should express
its interest. The agency thereby stays in the ball game; it may with-
draw from the proceeding at any later time with no apparent adverse
consequence.33
STEP 5. Ecology's Assembly and Transmittal of Application Forms
to Project Applicant
After all interested state agencies have responded, or have been
precluded by lapse of time from ever responding (STEP 4), Ecology is
to assemble and send to GW an application for every individual
permit needed. 34 In contrast to the carefully specified maximum of 15
29. ECPA § 4(2), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.040(2).
30. [T] he bar to requiring a permit subsequently shall not be applicable if the
master application provided the notified agency contained false, misleading, or
deceptive information, or other information, or lack thereof, which would reason-
ably lead an agency to misjudge its interest in a master application.
Id. We are highly unenthusiastic about punishing delay or error made by a state
agency by precluding the agency forever from enforcing a regulatory program. This is
a punishment which fits neither the crime nor the criminal, since it is visited on the
public for whose benefit regulatory and environmental laws are enacted.
31. See STEP 6 infra.
32. See note 41 infra.
33. A state agency responding affirmatively . . . may withdraw from further
participation . . . by written notification to the director [of the Department of
Ecology], if it subsequently appears to such state agency' that it has no permit
programs under its jurisdiction applicable to the project.
ECPA § 7, WASH. REV. CODE§ 90.62.070. Does this provision support an applicant's
argument that he too may withdraw without prejudice? See Part 11-D infra for one
important reason an applicant may wish to do so. This is a fruitful subject, we sug-
gest, for regulations.
34. ECPA § 6(8), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.060(8), provides that a state agency
may request or receive additional information "from an applicant and others" before
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days given sister agencies to respond to notice from Ecology of receipt
of a master application, the Act says nothing about how soon Ecology
must mail the applicant the required forms.3 5 Ecology must, however,
direct the applicant to complete and return all forms to Ecology
"within a reasonable time as specified by the department. '3 6 ECPA
leaves it to Ecology's regulations to specify what happens if GW is
late in returning completed applications.37
STEP 6. Public Hearing Called by Ecology
A reasonable time after completed application forms have been
received from GW by Ecology, and transmitted by Ecology to each
state agency which has indicated an interest in the project, Ecology
must publish at applicant's expense a newspaper notice three times at
intervals of one week, advertising a public hearing to take place at a
specified time not later than 20 days after publication of the third no-
tice.38 The notice must describe the project, and it must advise the
public that GW's master application and all permit applications are
available for inspection at three places: in the project's county, at
Ecology's Olympia office (which Ecology does not have39) and at
or after the public hearing, which we describe as STEP 7 infra. Suppose a sister
agency fails to respond affirmatively to Ecology that it has an interest, but requests in-
formation from the applicant. Does a literal reading of the Act forever preclude the
agency from enforcing its permit requirement? Doubtless another subject for regula-
tions.
35. ECPA § 4(3), WASH. REv. CODE § 90.62.040(3).
36. Id.
37. Suppose that on receipt of application forms for completion, General Widgets
discovers that some permits are too difficult to complete accurately at this stage be-
cause of possible alternative courses of action or extensive studies which must precede
the permits. An example would be a permit for groundwater, which may require
geohydrologic data not needed until completion of the plant several years in the fu-
ture. Also, there may exist a possibility that an available alternative to groundwater
may in the interim prove cheaper or more satisfactory. Can GW now dismiss, or
simply forget about the ECPA proceeding, and pursue individual applications as
needed just as if no application had ever been filed? See note 33 supra.
38. Publication must be in a newspaper of general circulation in each county
where the project would be constructed or operated. "The notice shall describe the
nature of the master application including, with reasonable specificity, the project
proposed, its location, the various permits applied for, and the state agency having
jurisdiction over each such permit." ECPA § 5(1), WASH. REv. CODE § 90.62.050(l).
The quoted sentence contains a solecism. The master application does not "include"
the permits applied for, or the agencies having jurisdiction, because the master appli-
cant does not know this at the time he prepares the application. This is probably
harmless.
39. See note 125 infra, second to last paragraph.
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Ecology's appropriate regional office, together with such other loca-
tions as Ecology may designate. 40
A unanimously expressed view by Ecology and all responding state
agencies that the hearing would be of no value permits an alternative.
Instead of a hearing, the public may submit information in writing
within 30 days.41
STEP 7. Public Hearing
Except with respect to the place (county in which all or a major
part of the project is located)42 and time the hearing begins,43 ECPA
says surprisingly little about the public hearing. Its purpose is "ob-
taining information for the assistance of state agencies" which are rep-
resented. 44 The chairman is the Director of the Department of Ecol-
ogy, or a hearing officer appointed by him. 45 Each interested agency
is to be represented by its executive officer, or his designee, and the
portion of the hearing related to the particular agency's permit shall
be conducted by that representative. The hearing may be continued
"from time to time and place to place." It shall be "recorded in any
manner suitable for transcription as determined by the department,"
but what, if anything, shall be done with the record ECPA leaves to
inference or future regulations. 46
40. ECPA § 5(1), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.050(1). See note 125 infra. Identi-
fying that office does not appear possible in all cases from WASH. AD. CODE § 173-02-
040(2) (Supp. 10A, 1972), quoted in note 125 infra.
41. ECPA § 5(2), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.050(2), says that no public hearing
is required after a unanimous agency response that a public hearing "would not be of
value taking into consideration the overall public interest" and a "careful evaluation
[by Ecology], taking into consideration all interests involved, including the oppor-
tunities for members of the public to present views." We would suppose that prep-
aration for a public hearing if it is to be meaningful would usually take more time,
not less, than is required for presentation of "relevant views and supporting materials
in writing." We fear that the 30 days for the written presentation, 20 for the oral,
bespeaks an expectation by the Legislature that hearings will serve to let off steam,
rather than to inform anyone.
42. Id.§ 6(1), WASH. REV. CODE§ 90.62.060(1).
43. See STEP 6 supra.
44. ECPA § 6(3), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.060(3).
45. Id. § 6(2), WASH. REV. CODE §90.62.060(2). "Chairman" and masculine pro-
nouns appear in ECPA and should be read generically to comprehend both sexes, a
common sense proposition which would have simplified the Legislature's task in Ch.
154. [1973] Wash. Laws, I st Ex. Sess. See Dybwad, Implementing Washington's ERA:
Problems With Wholesale Legislative Revision, 49 WASH. L. R EV. (1974).
46. ECPA § 6(2), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.060(2).
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The significant provisions about the hearing are stated in the nega-
tive. No provisions of the Washington Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)47 apply to the public hearing. Further, the hearing "shall not
be considered a trial or adversary proceeding. '48
Upon completion of the public hearing the chairman after con-
sulting agency representatives shall determine "the date" by which all
state agencies must forward "final decisions" on applications for per-
mits to Ecology.49 The chairman may later "extend that date "for rea-
sonable cause." 50
STEP 8. Agency Decisions
"Final decisions" on permit applications are made by each agency
administering an applicable permit law unless an agency has given a
negative response or has failed to respond to notice of Ecology's re-
ceipt of a master application (STEP 4). After each agency transmits
its substantive decisions to Ecology, Ecology is to incorporate all deci-
sions "into one document without modification," 51 and transmit the
document to the applicant. "Each state agency having jurisdiction.to
approve or deny an application for a permit shall have continuing
power as vested in it prior to enactment of this 1973 act to make such
determinations. 52
Judicial interpretation of SEPA has made clear that each agency
decision, if the decision is a major action significantly affecting the
environment, be preceded by an environmental impact statement. 53
47. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 34.04 (1963).
48. ECPA §6(3), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.060(3).
49. Id. § 6(4), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.060(4).
50. Id. ECPA § 6(5), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.060(5), contains parallel
provisions applicable when written "views and supporting material" are invited instead
of a public hearing.
51. Id. § 6(6), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.060(6).
52. Id. § 4(7), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.040(7). This provision creates awkward-
ness when, in 1974 or later, a permit statute is modified. The draftsman of future
amendments to each permit statute will have to specify whether it is intended pro
tanto to modify ECPA § 4(7). ECPA § 4(7) should provide: "The jurisdiction and
powers of each agency to approve or deny an application for a permit are not affected
by this chapter except as this chapter expressly provides."
ECPA § 4(8), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.040(8), preserves the power of agencies
at any time to require or receive additional information from an applicant or others.
53. See Part III infra, which contains a description of SEPA and how the Wash-
ington court has construed that Act.
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ECPA, however, makes no mention of how the impact statement is to
integrate into its procedures.
ECPA apparently affects the making of "final decisions" in only
two ways: (1) The time for agency decisions is established by the
chairman of the public hearing on completion of the hearing, after
consultation with agency representatives appointed to the hearing.
The time may be extended for "reasonable cause."54 (2) Each "final
decision" shall "set forth the basis for the conclusion reached together
with a final order denying the application for a permit or granting it,
subject to such conditions of approval as the deciding agency may
have power to impose." 55
STEPS 9 and 10. Administrative and Judicial Review
Any person aggrieved by final decisions of the state agencies may
obtain review by request filed with the Pollution Control Hearings
Board within 30 days after Ecology has created its "one document"
and transmitted it to the applicant (STEP 8). If review is sought of an
action granting or denying a substantial development permit under the
Shoreline Management Act,5 6 request for review must also be filed
with the Shorelines Hearings Board. In the latter event, review is by
both boards. The two boards are authorized to adopt rules and regula-
tions to implement ECPA's direction that there shall be "a single
staged hearing." 57
In all cases, scope and standard of review by the Boards under
ECPA are defined by Section 13 of the Washington Administrative
Procedure Act, R.C.W. § 34.04.130. That Section deals exclu-
sively with judicial review of contested cases and limits the reviewing
body's discretion to reversal of the administrative decision if, inter
54. ECPA § 4(4), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.040(4). ECPA § 4(5), WASH. REV.
CODE § 90.62.040(5), applies parallel provisions where the public hearing is replaced
by written submissions.
55. ECPA § 6(4) provides that a "final decision" shall "set forth the basis for the
conclusion reached." Juxtaposition of this provision with ECPA § 6(3), describing
the public hearing, supports a possible inference that the "basis for the conclusion
reached" should be related to information developed at the public hearing, but the
inference is weak. ECPA § 6(5) curiously omits any requirement to "set forth the
basis for the conclusion reached" when a public hearing is displaced by an invitation
for written submissions. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.62.060(4), (3), (5).
56. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.58 (Supp. 1972).
57. ECPA § 8(1), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.080().
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alia, it is "unsupported by material and substantial evidence in view of
the entire record as submitted; or ...arbitrary and capricious. '58
Thus, administrative review under ECPA is confined to the restrictive
standards for judicial review as set out by the APA, and neither Board
has power to review the facts de novo because R.C.W. § 34.04.130(5)
limits review to the record below, except in cases of procedural irregu-
larity.
II. LEGISLATIVE CORRECTIONS NEEDED
The concepts of ECPA are good. By "concepts" we mean the op-
portunity for a developer to find out what the law requires, the oppor-
tunity for the public to be heard at an early stage 59 after the various
agencies and their requirements have been identified, and a single re-
view proceeding thereafter. Unfortunately, ECPA contains serious
flaws which defeat its purposes. In this Part we shall list the egregious
flaws. Fortunately, all are readily correctable by legislation consistent
with the above concepts.
A. Neither Coordination nor Public Hearing Should be
Left to the Developer's Whims
ECPA states its first legislative purpose is to "provide for an op-
tional procedure" to assist applicants for permits. 60 That, however, is
not ECPA's only purpose, and the realization of the other purposes
should not be left to the choice of the developer.
Conceivably, most developers will choose to invoke ECPA because
it offers expedited procedures which place upon Ecology the onus of
contacting and coordinating all interested state agencies. In addition,
developers should know that avoiding ECPA does not necessarily
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(6) (1963).
59. David V. Schuy, Extension Economist, Cooperative Extension Service, Wash-
ington State University, Pullman, Washington, effectively criticized an early draft of
this paper which proposed that ECPA be amended to defer the public hearing until
after any impact statement is available to the public. He emphasizes, from experience
with public participation, that public involvement at an early state is important in
identifying issues and alternatives. His comment was the genesis of our proposal in
Part 111-C infra that the public hearing take place in two phases, one before and one
following availability of the impact statement.
60. See note 15 supra.
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avoid a public hearing. This is because the power of a state agency to
hold a hearing, if a hearing appears useful, is probably sufficient
without ECPA. 61 Finally, if state agencies become enthusiastic about
ECPA, the developer may perceive that his applications are likely to
be left on a back burner if he does not choose to follow the proce-
dures provided by ECPA.
Clearly not all projects are appropriate occasions for the intricate
ECPA procedures, but developer's choice is a poor way to select those
projects where the ECPA scheme of coordination and public partici-
pation is appropriate. ECPA procedures should be mandatory in all
cases, except that Ecology should have discretion to make a prelimi-
nary decision in some cases that the ECPA pattern need not be fol-
lowed.
B. County and City Zoning Laws Should be Coordinated With State
Agency Decisions and not Stultified
ECPA compels local governments "expeditiously" to issue a certifi-
cate that the project is in compliance with zoning laws and associated
comprehensive plans, or that none exists; thereafter the local govern-
ment may not change its applicable laws until ECPA procedures have
run their course, through judicial review. 62 This "expeditious" deci-
sion necessarily occurs before a full and complete consideration of
environmental issues relating to the project can be conducted by local
officials, because ECPA permits the developer to bypass at the local
level the impact statement requirements of SEPA. Section 10(1) of
ECPA provides:63
The provisions of the state environmental policy act relating to the
preparation of detailed impact statements shall not be applicable to
the action approving or denying certifications [by local governments)
authorized in this section.
61. In Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wn. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166,
(1973), the Washington supreme court noted that the predecessor of the Department
of Ecology held a public hearing, the authority for which the court did not identify.
The Washington Ecological Commission, see WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21A.170-.210
(Supp. 1972), has provided an umbrella for Ecology to hold lots of hearings. Where
two or more state officers or employees gather with the public in the name of the
environment, it probably is a public hearing if someone says it is a public hearing.
62. ECPA § I0(1), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.100(1).
63. Id.
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Because the role of local government concludes with issuance of the
certificate and no impact statement need be prepared at that time,
local government will be forced out of the action before the local
public can be informed fully by an ECPA hearing or an impact state-
ment that widget processing plants smell bad, pollute both air and
water, and harm the health of the community.
The recommended solution is to permit local government to partici-
pate like a state agency in the ECPA hearing,, then to make its zoning
decisions, and finally to participate in any coordinated administrative
and judicial review.64 This is the ECPA solution with respect to air
pollution and shoreline management, and it should be the solution to
zoning decisions whenever local government chooses.65 In addition,
the Legislature should delete the last sentence of Section 10(1), quoted
above. Two recent decisions by the Washington Supreme Court result
in a conclusion that SEPA requires an impact statement for zoning
decisions which have significant environmental effect.66 These cases
seem to bring SEPA, as judicially construed, into conflict with ECPA
Section 10(1), which clearly exempts zoning decisions from the im-
pact statement requirement. No case at all can be made for offering a
bypass of SEPA as a carrot to a developer who chooses ECPA; this
destroys the integrity of both Acts. Nor can a case be made for placing
certain zoning decisions outside the environmental mandates of SEPA,
on the sole ground that the decisions were made pursuant to an appli-
cation under ECPA. For these reasons, the exemption should be de-
leted.
64. Washington adhers to a minority view that an application for a zoning permit
gives the applicant a "vested right" in the zoning laws in force at date of application.
State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue, 45 Wn. 2d 452, 275 P.2d 895 (1954); Washington
ex rel. Hardy v. Superior Court, 155 Wash. 244, 284 P. 93 (1930). See Annot.,
50 A.L.R.3d 596, 632-35 (1973).
Haas v. Kirkland, 78 Wn. 2d 929, 481 P.2d 9 (1971), is a refusal to apply the
"vested right" rule to a fire protection ordinance and may point toward a narrowing
or extinction of the "vested right" view. Health and safety, the constitutional basis for
zoning ordinances, are overriding aspects of the police power and not easy to define
or limit.
65. For the limited purposes of this chapter only 'state agency' shall also mean
(a) any local or regional air pollution control authority established under chapter
70.94 RCW and (b) any local government when said government is acting in its
capacity as a decision maker on an application for a permit pursuant- to RCW
90.58.140 [Shoreline Management].
ECPA § 2(8), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.020(8).
66. See Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wn. 2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973); Eastlake
Community Council v. Roanoke Associates, 82 Wn. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973).
These cases are discussed in Part III-A infra.
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C. ECPA Should not Exclude "proprietary interests in publicly
owned property"
ECPA applies to projects for which a "permit" is required, and it
defines "permit" in broadest terms. Then it takes back much of the
definition when it says: "Nothing in this chapter shall relate to ... the
granting of proprietary interests in publicly owned property such as
sales, leases, use permits and licenses. '67 The effect, and apparently
the purpose, of that exclusion is to exempt from ECPA most of the
programs and activities of the Department of Natural Resources and
of its head official, the Commissioner of Public Lands.68 The Com-
missioner is an elected official, ex officio administrator of the Depart-
ment, and a constitutional officer 69 with perhaps greater prestige than
the Director of the Department of Ecology, who is politically ap-
pointed. The Commissioner has important authority, exercised
through "permits," over the tide, shore and other lands of the state.
His Department is not environmentally oriented, nor congenial to
public participation in its decision-making processes.70
Moreover, if the Legislature has determined that the Department of
Natural Resources should remain beyond coordination and beyond
public participation, except on its own terms, it should have the forti-
67. ECPA § 2(4), WASH. REV. CODE§ 90.62.020(4).
68. See Appendix A infra, letter from Mr. Charles B. Roe, Jr., Senior Assistant
Attorney General for the Department of Ecology.
69. The 31st amendment to the Washington Constitution in 1956 gave the
Legislature a still unexercised discretion to abolish the office of Commissioner of
Public Lands-and those of Auditor and Lieutenant Governor.
70. See, e.g., letter from Mr. Bert L. Cole, Commissioner of Public Lands, July 9,
1973, incorporated into Final Impact Statement by Department of Ecology for Pro-
posed Northwest Alloys Magnesium Plant at Addy, Washington. August, 1973, at
91-94. Responding to criticism of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in the
Draft Impact Statement of May, 1973, Mr. Cole wrote, in part:
We feel that we can build enough environmental safeguards into the reclamation
plans [with respect to mined land] so that environmental impacts will not be
significant. I suppose it is the Department of Ecology's prerogative to take excep-
tion to this, but it appears to me that DOE is attempting to tell DNR how to do
their job.
As to the merits of the row between Ecology and DNR over whether DNR must file
an impact statement, see Stempel, Roanoke and Loveless, Washington cases cited in
note 22 supra and discussed in Part III-A infra.
Whatever the merits of such an interagency conflict, resolution of that conflict
should be the responsibility of someone, in addition to that of the courts or of the
Washington Attorney General, whose assistants sometimes turn up on opposite sides
of the same litigation. This conflict would be for the Legislature.
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tude to say so-expressly.71 The controlling principle should be that
government as owner, employer or neighbor should be a good owner,
employer or neighbor. Whether government so chooses or not, it is a
model for its citizens. It should be a good model, rather than a bad
one.
D. Environmental Permit Decisions Should Have the Same
Standard of Review Under ECPA as in Cases Where ECPA
does not Apply
Administrative review by the Pollution Control Hearings Board and
Shorelines Hearings Board under ECPA is controlled by Section 13 of
the APA, which, prior to ECPA, applied only to judicial review of
contested cases. Under the scope of review allowed by Section 13, a
permit decision will be sustained unless it is unsupported by material
and substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or violative of any
other condition imposed by that Section.72 If, however, a developer
decides not to proceed under ECPA and subsequently appeals an ad-
verse agency decision to one of these same two Boards, he will be con-
fronted with a totally different standard of administrative review; in a
non-ECPA review proceeding, each Board is essentially authorized to
review the case de novo and is not constrained by the narrow standard
of review imposed by ECPA through Section 13 of the APA.7 3
ECPA's limitation of administrative review has several bad conse-
quences:
71. Mr. Justice Frankfurter may have been the last jurisprudential luminary to
understand the distinction between dominium and imperium, ownership and juris-
diction. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 43-44 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). The distinction could have been useful, if understood, but Justice Frank-
furter failed to make it so, and no one else is likely to succeed.
72. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
73. In all appeals involving a formal hearing.., the [Pollution Control Hearings]
board, and each member thereof, shall be subject to all duties imposed upon, and
shall have all the powers granted to, an agency by those provisions of [the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act] relating to contested cases.
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21B.160 (Supp. 1972). The Shoreline Management Act
contains a parallel provision, codified in WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.180(3) (Supp. 1972):
"The review proceedings authorized in . . . this section are subject to the provisions
of [the Administrative Procedure Act] pertaining to procedures in contested cases."
Agencies are given broad authority under the APA to adjudicate contested cases in
much the same manner that trial courts hear civil disputes. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 34.04.100 (1963). The Pollution Control Hearings Board and the Shorelines Hearings
Board presumably have like authority under the provisions quoted above when the
Boards review permit decisions of other agencies.
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(1) Both Boards are specialized agencies with specialized adminis-
trative expertise.74 To limit the scope of administrative review, where
ECPA has been invoked, defeats the legislative purpose of utilizing
expertise-a commendable purpose with nearly a century of adminis-
trative law behind it.
(2) Even if there were good reason to limit administrative review,
there is no justification to do so only in those cases where a developer
has invoked ECPA. Unless the Legislature corrects this mistake, the
Pollution Control Hearings Board may find on the same calendar two
identical decisions for review. In one, it might reverse because its
scope of review is prescribed by the APA unmodified by ECPA. In the
other it would affirm, because its review is limited to the standard
which Section 13 of the APA makes applicable to review of agency
action by a superior court. Such a result could not be explained except
by resort to the homely wisdom of Mr. Bumble.75
(3) The competing standards of review-ECPA and non-ECPA-
invite forum shopping by the developer. If the developer thinks the
agency will be favorable, but that the reviewing board will not, the
developer will choose ECPA. If he thinks the converse is likely, he
will avoid ECPA. ECPA will place a high premium on the ability to
assess and manipulate the "personal imponderables."
(4) Administrators, reviewing boards and courts are wont to do the
best they can with the laws the Legislature provides. In this instance,
they will exert every pressure to minimize inconsistent results which
depend on the path by which a matter comes to the reviewing board.
This will distort the important and useful distinctions between judicial
and administrative review.
74. The [pollution control] hearings board shall consist of three members
qualified by experience or training in pertinent matters pertaining to the environ-
ment, and at least one member of the hearings board shall have admitted to
practice law in this state and engaged in the legal profession at the time of his
appointment.
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.2 1B.020.
A shorelines hearings board sitting as a quasi judicial body is hereby established
which shall be made up of six members: Three members shall be members of
the pollution control hearings board; two members, one appointed by the associa-
tion of Washington cities and one appointed by the association of county com-
missioners, both to serve at the pleasure of the associations; and the state land
commisioner or his designee.
Id. § 90.58.170.
75. "The law is a ass." C. DICKENS, Oliver Twist ch. 51, in I THE WORKS OF
CHARLES DICKENS (1890).
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The provision criticized here is perhaps another political compro-
mise. Its result is to accord greater finality to decisions by Ecology
and by Ecology's sister agencies when ECPA is invoked than other-
wise. Even when values of compromise are recognized, however, the
price of this compromise is much too large.
E. ECPA Should Provide Coordination of Programs as well as
Agencies
The first purpose of ECPA is to assist those who "must obtain a
number of permits, from the department of ecology and one or more
state or local agencies. 76 ECPA allows, but does not require, Ecology
to establish a coordinated permit application processing procedure
which may be used "at the request of an applicant, in relation to two
or more permit programs administered solely by the department of
ecology."77 ECPA does not even authorize coordination if Ecology is
not one of the agencies administering a permit program.
Apparently the reason that coordination subject to ECPA is permit-
ted, but not required, when no state agency other than Ecology is
concerned, is that Ecology, as sponsor of ECPA, envisioned it as a
convenient means to coordinate its own programs. Apparently the
reason that no coordination is allowed if Ecology is not involved at all
is that ECPA is as far as Ecology had the cheek to ask the Legislature
to go in letting Ecology cook in the kitchens of its sister agencies.
Neither reason is adequate justification for not making coordina-
tion applicable to all environmental programs, regardless of the
agency administering them; coordination should depend only on
whether it furthers the interest of the public as distinguished from the
interest of various segments of the state bureaucracy. Agencies of state
government come and go, programs wax and wane, reorganizations
make big ones out of little ones, little ones out of big ones, and again
regroup.78 The considerations which should be emphasized in this
coordination process are need for the programs administered and their
efficiency. Making ECPA depend on the name of the agency adminis-
76. ECPA § 1(2)(a), WASH. REv. CODE § 90.62.010(2)(a).
77. Id. § 11(3), WASH. REV. CODE 90.62.110(3).
78. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.03 (1963) is the Water Code of 1917, with innum-
erable amendments. As handily reprinted by the Department of Ecology with revisions
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tering a program at a given moment makes it hard to keep those
considerations paramount.
Opportunistic exclusions from ECPA, moreover, are unlikely to
reduce interagency tensions. Suppose, for example, that the only pro-
gram that Ecology administers for which GW needs a permit is an
appropriation of groundwater. Probably GW will not need ground-
water, but a master application reveals the possibility of need. In every
sense, groundwater in this case poses a fringe and dispensable issue,
but its inclusion by GW in a master application opens the door to
ECPA. Clearly, ECPA as drawn invites manipulative decisions by
developers, by state agencies, and by the Legislature in considering
agency reorganizations. This is clearly regrettable.
III. THE OPPORTUNITY WHICH ECPA OFFERS:
MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COORDINATION WITH
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
After some intensive study of ECPA we have concluded that in ad-
dition to the flaws described in the preceding section, ECPA's most
serious failure is its failure to coordinate between its procedures and
those of SEPA. ECPA's only express reference to SEPA is the sen-
tence in Section 10(1) which provides that no detailed environmental
impact statement is required when a local government certifies that a
project is in compliance with all zoning laws and comprehensive
plans. That sentence must be deleted, for reasons earlier stated,79 if
ECPA and SEPA are to function. The problem referred to here, how-
ever, is an apparent total failure to coordinate ECPA and SEPA.8°
Since the Legislature clearly did not intend to repeal SEPA when it
enacted ECPA, it is apparent that the Legislature "intended" coordi-
nation with SEPA. We here propose a regulatory scheme which would
transform that intent into reality.
through June, 1973, it still refers to "the supervisor of water resources" and to "the
supervisor." Neither in Ecology nor in its predecessor agency nor elsewhere in
Washington State government has there for years been an official with that title. It
may be arguable whether the vastly important powers and duties of "the supervisor"
reside in one person or several, in Lacey, Tumwater, Redmond or some other place.
79. See Part 1I-B supra.
80. Coordination between ECPA and SEPA was proposed by ECPA's major
draftsman, Mr. Charles B. Roe, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General for the
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A. The State Environmental Policy Act of 1971
Patterned closely after the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA),81 SEPA is the Washington Legislature's sweeping
response to recognition that population increase, in combination with
accelerating per capita appetites for goods, services and energy,
threaten the quality of life in a uniquely magnificent state. SEPA
broadly declares that it is the "continuing responsibility" of the state
and "all agencies of the state to use all practicable means, consistent
with other essential considerations of state policy, to improve and
coordinate plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that
the state and its citizens may:"'82
(a) Fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations;
(b) Assure for all people of Washington safe, healthful, productive,
and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(c) Attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and
untimely consequences;
(d) Preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our
national heritage;
(e) Maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports
diversity and variety of individual choice;
(f) Achieve a balance between population and resource use which
will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's ameni-
ties; and
(g) Enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
The detailed environmental impact statement is SEPA's major de-
vice to discharge this awesome task. R.C.W. § 43.21C.030 directs that
"all branches of government of this state, including state agencies,
municipal and public corporations, and counties" shall include an
impact statement "in every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major actions significantly affecting the
483
Department of Ecology, but the proposal was rejected by the Legislature. See draft
Section 1.2 (proposed but never incorporated) which concludes Appendix A infra.
81. 83 Stat. 852(1970), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1970).
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.2 IC.020.
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quality of the environment."83 "Major actions" and "significantly af-
fecting" are not self-defining terms. The Washington courts and Ecol-
ogy, however, have thus far taken the Legislature at its word; any
other course would do violence to language which is as broad as could
be drafted. The same Section of SEPA directs that "policies, regula-
tions and laws of the state of Washington shall be interpreted and
administered in accordance with the policies set forth .... 84 All
branches of state government must utilize "a systematic, interdisci-
plinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural
and social sciences and the design arts." The responsible official (not
precisely identifiable from the SEPA text) must consult with "any
public agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with
respect to any environmental impact involved." 85
As enacted in 1971, SEPA lacked two essentials. First, the responsi-
bilities it placed upon government have not been, and cannot be,
achieved without coordinated administrative implementation by which
state and local government can carry out the legislative will. Judicial
enforcement cannot go beyond halting projects until a proper im-
pact statement has been prepared. Second, while SEPA directs
preparation of an impact statement in specified situations, SEPA
leaves the substantive effect of the statement unclear. The Act directs
that an impact statement be prepared but fails to tell the preparer
what to do with it or who to give the final statement to. Further con-
sideration of the present status of these two essentials is necessary be-.
fore an intelligent approach can be made to the problem of whether
and how to factor SEPA into the ECPA procedure.
Plans for coordinated administrative implementation, the first es-
83. Id. § 43.21C.030(2) (emphasis added). The statute requires the responsible
official to produce a detailed statement on:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action;
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented;
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action;
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented;
Id. § 43.2 IC.030(2)(c).
84. Id. § 43.21C.030(I).
85. Id. § 43.21C.030(2)(d).
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sential, can easily be described-there are almost none. 86 Unlike
NEPA, which established a Council on Environmental Quality to
guide federal agencies, 87 and unlike California's Environmental
Quality Act (EQA),88 which is accompanied by definitive guidelines
patterned after the federal model,89 Washington's SEPA leaves indi-
vidual governmental officials and entities to struggle without coordi-
nation or resources to obey SEPA's sweeping command. Ecology has
distributed unofficial guidelines,90 but it has not attempted to give
them any official status, perhaps because of doubt about statutory
authority to do so.91
86. Ecology has express statutory authority, in only two very limited contexts, to
implement and coordinate SEPA: (1) Ch. 179, [1973] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.,
effective on July 1, 1973, under an emergency clause, permits Ecology by rule to
exempt building permits and "acts of governmental agencies concerning an individual
single family residence" from the detailed impact statement of SEPA. (2) A coordi-
nated impact statement requirement applicable to new highways and new right-of-way
acquisitions requires a report from the Department of Highways, transmitted to
Ecology for review by the Director. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 47.04.110-.130. A public
hearing follows rather than precedes the impact report.
87. The duties of the Council, as delineated in 42 U.S.C. § 4344, are essentially
threefold: The Council acts as an environmental advisor to the President, conducts
independent studies of its own to analyze and define changes and trends in the
environment, and rides herd on the federal agencies by reviewing and appraising
agency programs established to implement NEPA. The first two duties are manifested
in a yearly Environmental Quality Report, required by 42 U.S.C. § 4341, to be
transmitted by the President to Congress; the Report is primarily the work product
of the Council in its advisory capacity to the President. The third duty has resulted
in promulgation of Federal Guidelines for the Implementation of NEPA, see 36 Fed.
Reg. 7724 et seq. (197 1), which comprise the standard under which individual agencies
structure their regulations for compliance with NEPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 4333. The
Federal Guidelines, along with those promulgated by individual federal agencies,
provide a useful model for implementation of Washington's Act.
88. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-174 (West Supp. 1973). The California
Environmental Quality Act of 1970 (EQA) was extensively amended in 1972, in
large measure as a response to Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors, 8 Cal.
3d 1, 500 P.2d 1360, 104 Cal. Rptr. 16, as modified, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049,
104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972). The amendments provide additional guidance for state
and local government regarding the mechanics of preparing and submitting environ-
ment impact reports.
Under California's three-tier system (the Act, the State Guidelines and local
regulations) individual state agencies fashion their own programs to implement EQA
under the uniform hand of the Guidelines and the Act, much as federal agencies
function under the purview of the Council on Environmental Quality and NEPA.
89. 14 CAL. AD. CoDE §§ 1500 et seq. (1973).
90. See Washington State Department of Ecology, Guidelines for Implementation
of the State Environmental Policy Act of 197 1, December, 1972.
The Guidelines were widely distributed in February and March, 1972, for review
and comment but have never appeared in the Washington Administrative Code.
91. Cf. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21083 which expressly delegates authority to the
California Office of Planning and Research to prepare and develop proposed guide-
lines for the implementation of EQA by state agencies. The Washington Legislature
should supply this omission.
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Resolution of questions about the second essential, the substantive
effect of SEPA, is more difficult, but recent Washington appellate de-
cisions construing SEPA recognize that the Act demands of a govern-
mental body much more than mere mechanical preparation of an
impact statement. In Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Asso-
ciates,92 decided after ECPA's enactment, the Washington Supreme
Court held that renewal of a building permit for a highrise condo-
minium on the shore of Seattle's Lake Union was a major action,
which, when coupled with the conceded significant environmental
impact of the project, required an impact statement before the project
could continue. :93
The . . . renewal of the building permit was a "major action" be-
cause it involved a discretionary nonduplicative stage of the building
department's approval proceedings relative to an ongoing major
project.
The developer argued that no impact statement was required in this
case because the Building Department was bound and limited in its
considerations to the Seattle Building Code, and thus the renewal was
a nondiscretionary, ministerial action falling outside the standard for
"major action" quoted above. The court held, however, that such a
claim was not meritorious because SEPA has introduced discretionary
environmental factors into what would otherwise be ministerial gov-
ernmental decisions: 94
SEPA requires an integration of environmental factors into the normal
governmental decision-making processes, so that the 'presently un-
quantified environmental amenities and values will be given appro-
priate consideration in decision making along with economic and tech-
nical considerations.'
92. 82 Wn. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36(1973).
93. Id. at 490, 513 P.2d at 46 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 492, 513 P.2d at 47 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030 (2)(b)).
"SEPA mandates governmental bodies to consider the total environmental and eco-
logical factors to the fullest in deciding major matters." 82 Wn. 2d at 490, 513 P.2d at 46.
A recent Washington court of appeals case, decided 20 days prior to Roanoke,
lends support to this proposition. In Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. Kirkland.
9 Wn. App. 59, 73, 510 P.2d 1140, 1149 (1973), the court said:
The change in the substantive law brought about by SEPA introduces an element
of discretion into the making of decisions that were formerly ministerial, such
that even if we assume, arguendo, that the issuance of a grading permit was
prior to SEPA a ministerial act, SEPA makes it legislative and discretionary.
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The import of the Roanoke court's "broad and vigorous construc-
tion"9 5 of SEPA is clear: SEPA does not merely impose procedural
requirements but is intended to have a real effect on substantive gov-
ernmental decisions.96 Mere satisfaction of standards in present codes
and regulations will not suffice when SEPA applies; where the decision
constitutes a major action significantly affecting the quality of the
environment, environmental factors must be considered as well. 97
The Washington court believed that the Legislature meant what it
said in SEPA.
SEPA clearly applies to state and local government actions of the
type which ECPA is to coordinate. In Roanoke the Washington court
said:98
95. 82 Wn. 2d at 490, 53 P.2d at 46.
96. Because both SEPA and the California Act are patterned after NEPA, the
Washington court in Roanoke utilized judicial interpretation of EQA and NEPA as
persuasive authority for its decision.
The trend among federal courts has been to give NEPA substantive, not just
procedural, effect. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d
289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972):
The unequivocal intent of NEPA is to require agencies to consider and give effect
to the environmental goals set forth in the Act, not just to file detailed impact
studies which will fill government archives.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agrees. See Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Following the federal example, the California supreme court has given a similar
interpretation to EQA. See Friends of Mammoth, 8 Cal. 3d at 254-55, 502 P.2d at
1053, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
97. In so concluding, the Washington court drew support from a case decided
four months earlier which construed SEPA in the context of a claim by the Depart-
ment of Water Resources (now part of the Department of Ecology) that environ-
mental factors need not be considered when acting upon a water appropriation
application. In Stempel v. Dep't of Water Resources, 82 Wn. 2d 109, 118, 508 P.2d
166, 171 (1973), the court held that SEPA made "[e) nvironmental protection . . .
a mandate to every state and local agency and department. Consideration of environ-
mental values is advanced under SEPA."
One commentator has pointed out articulately the practical difficulties inherent in
environmental balancing by agency decision-makers. See Murphy, The National
Environmental Policy Act and the Licensing Process: Environmentalist Magna Carta
or Agency Coup de Grace?, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 963, 973-81 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Murphy]. This commentator sees a need for more definitive legislative standards
before NEPA can become a workable tool for the federal agencies. Cf. Crampton &
Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water: NEPA and the Federal Bureaucracy, 71
MICH. L. REv. 511, 520, 527 (1973); Friedman, The National Environmental Policy,
Act of 1969-The Brave New World of Environmental Legislation, 6 NAT. REs. LAw.
44, 56-65 (1973). "Similarly, the whole concept of preparing an impact statement
is to 'ensure that the balancing analysis is carried out and given full effect' [citing
Calvert Cliffs] ." Id. at 65.
98. 82 Wn. 2d at 489, 513 P.2d at 45.
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Government agencies essentially affect the environment in two
ways. First, they may ... grant permits or licenses to private projects
affecting the environment [citing Stempel v. Department of Water
Resources'1" and Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors,00 ].
Second, the governmental agencies may initiate and develop projects
of their own . . . . Under either agency function, [agency] activities
are the 'action' covered by SEPA though in the first example the actual
project is undertaken by a non-governmental entity.
Loveless vs. Yantis' 01 later confirmed this construction of SEPA by
requiring an impact statement from a board of county commissioners
prior to granting a preliminary plat for a condominium project. Fed-
eral interpretations of NEPA, 10 2 and California interpretations of
EQA, 103 are in accord. Judicial application of SEPA to agency licens-
ing of private developers removes the last logical hurdle between
SEPA and ECPA. Thus, the burden falls rightfully on ECPA, as an
administrative framework for expediting permits, to give practical
substance to SEPA in this context.
B. The Problem-Lack of Coordination Between SEPA and ECPA
The problem posed by the Legislature's apparent failure to coordi-
nate ECPA with SEPA is twofold: (1) Without agency input and su-
pervision, the private developer is left free to produce an impact state-
ment which may meet the procedural letter of SEPA but avoid the
99. 82 Wn. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166(1973).
100. 8 Cal. 3d 1, 500 P.2d 1360, 104 Cal. Rptr. 16, as modified, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502
P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
101. 82Wn. 2d 754,513 P.2d 1023 (1973).
102. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, supra note 96 (NEPA
applies to AEC licensing of nuclear electrical power producing facilities); Citizens
for Clean Air v. Corps of Engineers, 349 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (NEPA
applies to applications by private parties to construct facilities or discharge wastes
into navigable waters); Natural Resources Council v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 170
(D.D.C. 1972) (NEPA applies to sale of oil lease on continental shelf by Interior
Department).
Both the President and the Council on Environmental Quality seem to have con-
strued licensing as falling within NEPA. See Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 104
(1970) and the Federal Guidelines § 5(a) (ii), 36 Fed. Reg. at 7724. See generally
Murphy, supra note 97, at 966-67.
103. See Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors, supra note 100. The legis-
lative and administrative response to that case are comprehensively discussed in
Seneker, The Legislative Response to Friends of Mammoth---Developers Chase the
Will-O'-The-Wisp, 48 CAL. B.J. 127 (1973) and Ackerman, Impact Statements anzd
Low Cost Housing, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 754, 777-86 (1973).
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spirit of the Act by presenting only the developer's side of the argu-
ment. (2) As presently constituted, ECPA totally ignores the impact
statement as a vehicle for bringing environmental issues before the
public and the decision-makers in comprehensive and comprehensible
form. Instead, the issues are supposedly aired at a public hearing
which occurs before the public has had an ample opportunity to iden-
tify, much less digest, the environmental implications of the project,
and before the agencies have had an opportunity to bring their exper-
tise to bear on the problem. The purpose of this section is to point out
the consequences of these two deficiencies.
Without coordination between ECPA and SEPA, the chances for
an objective impact statement prepared by a developer proceeding
under ECPA are slim. The studies and the writing which precede the
final report constitute an expensive, time-consuming business, and
much of the time consumed must be that of experts, not press release
writers. As a practical matter, impact statements are usually prepared
by the well-financed developer because he alone possesses the neces-
sary resources. He usually obtains the sought-after permit because his
impact statement meets the mechanical requirements of SEPA. Mr.
Justice Douglas, dissenting in United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),04 identified this problem
threatening NEPA and SEPA when he quoted one of the major con-
gressional sponsors of NEPA:I05
I am fearful that we are breeding a race of impact statement writers
who put all the right words down but don't really get environmental
concerns involved in the decision-making process .... The impact
statement should be a discipline [for inserting environmental factors
into the judgmental process] and also a process by which the public
can be informed and brought into the decision-making process.
If the developer supplies the "right words," they are likely to be the
ones most favorable to his cause, which is project completion with a
minimum of quibbling over environmental amenities. The decis-
ion-maker is thus left with a project justification statement.' 06 SEPA
104. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). In SCRAP, a divided Supreme Court held on narrow
grounds of statutory construction that NEPA did not repeal by implication the
Interstate Commerce Commission's exclusive power to suspend rates.
105. 412 U.S. at 713 n.10 (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoting Representative Dingell.
106. See, e.g., the criticisms contained in the Trial Court's Oral Decision in
Mensalvas v. Spellman, Civil No. 755-567 (King County Superior Court, Sept. 15,
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affords an opportunity for judicial intervention when a procedural
step-including the "right words"-has been missed. However, once
a body of law has been created from cases like Stempel, Roanoke and
Loveless, procedural miscues by developers are likely to become infre-
quent, and successful judicial challenges under SEPA will also become
rare. 10 7 After less than three years, SEPA is approaching the end of its
useful course unless the public resources available for the administra-
tion of its purposes and policies are made effective. This requires a
coordinated administrative scheme that will not only provide some
uniformity to SEPA's implementation, but will also insert a reasonable
semblance of objectivity into the impact statement.
The second aspect of the problem created by lack of coordination
between ECPA and SEPA arises from the timing of the public
hearing. STEP 7 of the ECPA scheme, as outlined in Part I supra, is a
public hearing "conducted for the purpose of obtaining information
for the assistance of state agencies . . . ." This "information" can only
come from an intelligent discussion and debate at the hearing about
the environmental issues raised by the project. Another objective of
the hearing is to provide a forum where the public can present its
views on "proposed uses of natural resource and related environ-
mental matters" prior to the final decisions under ECPA. ECPA
cannot achieve either of these two goals for the following reasons. No
mechanism is provided for identifying and investigating the environ-
mental issues prior to the hearing, because the hearing occurs before
the agencies have had full time or opportunity to bring their expertise
and experience to bear on what may be a complex and highly tech-
nical problem. One consequence of this failure will be to nullify the
hearing's function as a forum to generate meaningful information for
1972), where the trial judge commented that only 17 pages of a 180 page impact
statement drafted by proponents of the King County Domed Stadium were devoted
to possible alternatives to the proposed action. In addition, the trial judge found rather
remarkable the fact that no mention was made of the visual effect which the massive
structure would have on downtown Seattle. Trial Court's Oral Decision, at 3-5.
Nevertheless, the impact statement met the procedural requirements of SEPA, and
the project has gone ahead as scheduled.
107. The present prominence of successful judicial actions by environmentalists
under NEPA may be illusory. The primary use of NEPA has been as a delaying tactic
to scuttle the projects of proponents who failed to go through the procedural motions
specified by the Act. As impact statement writing becomes more of a fine art, how-
ever, the usefulness of NEPA and its state counterparts as obstructional weapons of
militant environmentalists will decline. See Comment, The National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969: Analysis and Judicial Interpretation, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 71,
90-91 (1973).
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the permit decisions. Lacking an ordered presentation of the environ-
mental issues, the hearing will produce at best a haphazard and tenta-
tive identification of problems, subject to later revision by the agen-
cies. A second consequence will be to deprive the public of a viable
voice in ECPA. Without expert assistance, which few public interest
groups are able to afford and which ECPA fails to provide, the public
is left to fend for itself in the hearing against the considerable re-
sources of the developer. As a consequence, the ECPA forum becomes
an illusory one for the public, and government is deprived of mean-
ingful counterarguments to those of the developer.
C. How Coordination of ECPA and SEPA Should Work
We propose to alleviate the foregoing problem by using the impact
statement required by SEPA as the vehicle to accomplish the neces-
sary integration of the two Acts. The core of our solution is bifurca-
tion of the ECPA public hearing so that a draft impact statement is
made available for study before the second phase of the hearing.
Rather than leaving the impact statement solely to the developer, the
modified procedure would provide some agency supervision over its
preparation. The developer would be able to benefit from the availa-
bility of agency expertise assembled at the first phase of the hearing.
The result will be a more objective and comprehensive impact state-
ment, which will be available to governmental bodies well in advance
of their final decisions, so that SEPA's mandate to consider environ-
mental impacts can be honored. Conversely, the impact statement will
achieve an objective of ECPA by giving direction to the participants
at the ECPA public hearing, making the hearing more than an unat-
tended ceremony or a shouting match. Hence, this emphatic
conclusion-ECPA and SEPA must be read in pari materia.
This solution would operate in the following manner: Soon after
Ecology has advertised the availability of the developer's applications,
phase one of the public hearing should be convened. The hearing
agenda at phase one should include three items, although the second
and third will not always be reached if the answer to the first item is
no: First, is an impact statement to be prepared?108 Second, if so, how
108. No more than one impact statement should be prepared for each master
application acted upon. The advantages of a single impact statement are obvious.
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can the thoroughness and objectivity of the prospective statement be
optimized? Third, what opportunities exist at this phase of the hearing
for public participation in preparation of the impact statement? 09
The courts have made clear that a decision not to prepare an impact
statement is judicially reviewable. Therefore, the ECPA hearing
should recess, rather than terminate, until it is clear that no judicial
review will be sought of a decision that no impact statement be pre-
pared.110 Phase two is a second part of the hearing reconvened after a
draft impact statement has been made available for study. The first
item on the phase two agenda should be the adequacy of the impact
statement, and the second item is interchange among the participants
for the purpose of supplying useful information to the participating
agencies and providing a forum for public participation in agency de-
cision-making.
This bifurcated procedure will enhance ECPA's usefulness by
making a draft statement available at the public hearing. At phase one
Several agencies may discern a significant environmental effect resulting from their
individual decisions on permits, but a single, coordinated document obviates the neces-
sity for preparing multiple, often duplicative statements.
Furthermore, the cumulative effect of granting all permits requested under the
master application can be more accurately assessed by a coordinated statement. One
of the primary purposes of SEPA is to avoid the adverse impact which takes place
when various aspects of a project are myopically authorized by different agencies in a
piecemeal fashion without regard to the cumulative effect of the total development.
See Juanita Bay, 9 Wn. App. at 72, 510 P.2d at 1149, and cited federal authority
construing NEPA. See also Federal Guidelines § 5(b), 36 Fed. Reg. at 7724.
Roanoke raised the bothersome possibility of multiple impact statements for a
multi-stage project, 82 Wn. 2d at 489, 513 P.2d at 45-46, but a single statement
would be permissible under ECPA because all state permit decisions can be considered
contemporaneously.
109. Although SEPA does not require a public hearing, use of the ECPA hearing
to implement SEPA is consistent with federal administrative precedents. Administrators
of NEPA and California's EQA have recognized that the public role in bringing
environmental values before the decision-makers is an important one. Federal Guide-
lines § 10(e), 36 Fed. Reg. at 7726, directs that:
These procedures [to be established by individual agencies] shall include.
whenever appropriate, provision for public hearings, and shall provide the public
with relevant information, including information on alternative courses of action ....
The Federal Power Commission and Atomic Energy Commission regulations provide
that the subject impact statement will be considered in the hearing, if a hearing is
held. See FPC NEPA Regulations, 18 C.F.R. §§ 2.80 et seq., 2.81(b) (1973); AEC
NEPA Regulations, 10 C.F.R. § 50 app. D, 10 (1973). Cf. California Guidelines
§§ 15164-65, 14 CAL. AD. CODE at 3 15.
110. If the decision is not to prepare an impact statement, then the reasons for
that decision should be set forth in a written negative declaration which is filed with
the Governor and made available for public scrutiny. Cf. California Guidelines
§ 15033, CAL. AD. CODE at 293. As Stempel, Roanoke and Loveless have shown, a
decision not to prepare a SEPA impact statement is judicially reviewable.
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all the cognizant agencies have been identified and each is repre-
sented. Ideally, phase one would aim for an objective impact state-
ment by assigning responsibility for conducting the necessary studies
and writing parts of the draft impact statement to participating agen-
cies on the basis of statutory authority and expertise of each. Practi-
cally, present budgetary and manpower constraints prevent burdening
state and local government with sole responsibility for preparation of
all impact statements arising from private' developer applications
under ECPA. 111 The compromise solution is to leave the financial
burden where it presently rests-with the developer-while achieving
statement objectivity by giving cognizant agencies the power to
supervise its preparation. Phase one can be utilized by the agencies to
inform the developer that certain alternatives must be considered, or
that certain environmental effects must be investigated, which the
developer might otherwise choose to ignore or gloss over. Developers
may be able to benefit at this point from agency expertise, since avail-
ability of past agency studies could negate the necessity for duplicative
actions carried out at the developer's expense. Although it stops short
of requiring neutral agencies to prepare all ECPA impact statements,
this solution would enhance the objectivity, and hopefully the quality,
of such statements while remaining within the bounds of fiscal reality.
The readers who will benefit from early preparation of an impact
statement are: (1) The public, which has been represented and has
probably identified some of its concerns in phase one; (2) the public
agencies, which are to make decisions with respect to permits needed by
the applicant; and (3) the Legislature, which must ultimately act to fill
in the statutory gaps where existing law is lacking or inadequate to
safeguard the environment. Phase one will match up environmental
impacts with agency expertise, resources and statutory authority.11 2
By exercising discretion during this step, Ecology, the coordinating
111. Preparation of an impact statement can be, and often is, a very expensive
proposition. See note 124 infra.
112. Under NEPA and California's EQA, the "lead agency" must consult with
and obtain the comments of any agency which has jurisdiction by law and may obtain
the comments of any agency or person with special expertise with respect to the
environmental impact involved. "Lead agency" refers to that federal or state agency
which has primary authority for committing the government to a course of action
with significant effect. See Federal Guidelines §5(b), 36 Fed. Reg. at 7724;. California
Guidelines § 15085, 14 CAL. AD. CODE at 204. Under ECPA, all agencies with
statutory jurisdiction to grant or deny permits would share lead agencyresponsibilities.
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agency, will play a role analogous to NEPA's Council on Environ-
mental Quality.1 13 If no agency can be identified with jurisdiction
over a specific environmental impact, then the problem is inadequacy
of the laws, and this is a matter to be addressed to the Legislature by
the public, by an agency (if its regulations or resources are merely
inadequate) or the chairman of the hearing (if no law exists). 114 Simi-
larly, if conflict among represented agencies cannot be resolved, the
problem is also one for the Legislature.
Every impact statement prepared under this procedure should in-
clude not only an assessment of the environmental impact of a pro-
posed action and the alternatives to that action, but also an identifica-
tion of the responsible agencies, the relevant laws which they adminis-
ter, and their administrative regulations related to the problem. If de-
cision-makers and laws are not identified the useful future for public
participation in ECPA and SEPA is nil. Public participation is mean-
ingless when it consists of castigating the Director of Widget Licensing
for doing or failing to do something about which the laws give him no
choice.
Under the procedure proposed here, the draft impact statement
provides a reservoir of information for meaningful public participa-
tion at phase two of the hearing, 115 and what better forum for such
participation than a public meeting with representatives of each
agency empowered to make decisions? Deficiencies in the draft state-
ment can be identified by cognizant agencies at phase two and cor-
rected by the developer. After circulation among the agencies for re-
view and comment, the final version will be compiled, thus insuring
that the impact statement, complete with public input and prepared
113. See note 87 supra. Among other duties, the CEQ is empowered to determinejurisdictional questions among the agencies. See Federal Guidelines § 5(b). 36 Fed.
Reg. at 7725. Both the Federal and California Guidelines contain useful keys for
determination of which agencies have authority and expertise in what areas. See
Federal Guidelines app. II, 36 Fed. Reg. at 7727; California Guidelines app. B.. 14
CAL. AD. CODE at 319.
114. ECPA § 6(2), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.060(2), prescribes that the
Director of the Department of Ecology, or his designee, shall chair the public hear-
ing. The Director may submit recommendations for new legislation to the Governor
after obtaining the advice of the Ecological Commission under authority of legislation
creating the Department of Ecology and the Ecological Commission. See WASH. REV.
CODE §8 43.21C. 190(5), .200 (Supp. 1972).
115. Comprehensive presentation of views by the public at a hearing requires at a
minimum an understanding of the issues involved and alternatives available. Without
information presented by the impact statement, laymen will be normally unequipped
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by the developer under at least some neutral agency supervision, will
be available for use by agencies when they are called upon by Ecology
to render final decisions.
Although both legislative history and internal evidence in ECPA
support a conclusion to the contrary,116 we are persuaded that a
reading of ECPA and SEPA in pari materia not only authorizes, but
compels, the bifurcated proceeding outlined above. ECPA is precise
about the time when the hearing is to begin but does not say when it
should terminate; the chairman may continue the meeting "from time
to time." 1 7 This might be regarded as tacit authorization bf a bifur-
cated hearing, but our conclusion rests on a much firmer foundation
than this. The public hearing designed by ECPA to elicit response to
the proposed project is an exercise in futility if the public is unin-
formed because it has no access to a draft impact statement."18 It
would be even worse if the date set by Ecology for final agency deci-
sions preceded the date of availability of the impact statement, thus
frustrating the purpose of SEPA to bring environmental values before
decision-makers." 9 In either case, the public hearing or impact state-
ment becomes a costly and useless exercise. The hearing therefore
should be recessed, not terminated, until it is clear that neither agency
decision nor later judicial action will compel preparation of an impact
statement.
We have attempted only to outline coordination; the reader's un-
derstanding of this coordination will be aided by Appendix C infra, a
to assimilate the mass of technical considerations and trade-offs raised by the master
application, and unable to transform what they do know into viable arguments in the
public interest. See generally Ruckelshaus, The Citizen and the Environmental Process,
47 IND. L.J. 636, 637 (1972); Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceed-
ings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 388-403 (1972); Bolle, Public Participation and Environmental
Quality, 11 NAT. REs. J. 497 (1971).
Technical data will be rendered comprehensible to the public through the impact
statement. The importance of making expertise available and comprehensible to the
public cannot be overemphasized if the public voice is to be meaningful at all in the
environmental arena. See Gellhorn, supra, at 393-94; Lucas & Moore, The Utah
Controversy: A Case Study of Public Participation in Pollution Control, 13 NAT.
RES. J. 36, 57-60, 72-75 (1973); Cramton, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field-
Peril or Promise? 25 AD. L. REv. 147 (1973).
116. E.g., ECPA § 10(1) expressly makes SEPA's requirement of an impact
statement inapplicable to the step by local government granting or denying certification
that local zoning ordinances and plans have been complied with.
117. See ECPA § 6(2), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.060(2).
118. See note 115 supra.
119. See notes 92-97 and accompanying text supra.
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schematic diagram which compares the present and proposed ECPA
formats. Only one legislative change-authorizing local governments
to participate at a public hearing and to render their decisions after
hearing, and not before-is clearly necessary. 120 Even that amend-
ment is not necessary if ECPA is to coordinate only state agencies.
Experience may reveal other pressing problems and the need for
other legislative revisions. A number of problems are related to
ECPA's requirement that all agency decisions be made and returned
to Ecology by the same date. 121 A project applicant who needs 16
permits, each based on a separate costly investigation and each essen-
tial to the project, will, if he pays for the investigations, prefer to get
the answer to the most doubtful application first. If the answer is no,
he will likewise prefer to seek review before paying for 15 other inves-
tigations which will be useless unless and until that first no becomes a
yes.
Economy and effectiveness are enhanced by a sequencing of what
should be studied, what should be reported, and what should be de-
cided, both in preparation of impact statements and the permit deci-
sions to which the statements relate. Such sequencing could be a
major facet of coordination among agency representatives at phase
one of the hearing. Sequencing, however, takes more time than if ev-
erything moves toward decision at once. Each case is likely to be dif-
ferent. If the investigation of a doubtful application will take six
months, while the other 15 investigations are costly but will take only
three days, coordination should delay the 15 others until the longer
investigation has been completed, and until an affirmative decision on
the six-month matter is final. This will be hard to accomplish and still
comply with ECPA's mandate for a single staged administrative re-
view. 122 Before an actual case has been examined, however, we would
opine that the coordination described is not impossible. Agreement
by the applicant would, of course, help. 123 But can "the public"-
120. As discussed in Section II-B supra, the present procedure stultifies needlessly
local zoning laws and wrongfully deletes actions taken under these laws from the
requirements of SEPA. Elevating local government into the ECPA framework would
allow the local voice to be heard in the impact statement and public hearing, while
satisfying the judicial rule stated in that section.
121. See ECPA §§ 6(4), (6), WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.62.060(4), (6).
122. See ECPA § 8, WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.080.
123. For example, a noncritical permit involving years of hydrologic investigation
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represented only by those who attend the hearing-effectively stipu-
late? Probably not, but there may be an accommodation.
A critical problem with ECPA and SEPA-alone or together-is
cost.124 Dollar cost is only the most easily measured element of
cost. Should ECPA regulations require compulsory attendance of all
representatives of all agencies for several days of a hearing on an air
pollution aspect of a project to which only one agency representative
can make a contribution? Or should attendance be voluntary? How
should the alternative costs be calculated, and can calculations in-
clude the cost of doing without services of agency representatives at
other tasks? We cannot provide an answer, but we are convinced that
Ecology's regulations and its 1975 report should expressly address all
such problems. Otherwise, the Legislature cannot discover how and
whether ECPA really works.
We have proposed to bridge the gap between ECPA and SEPA
using the two primary assets which ECPA offers, interagency coordi-
nation and public participation. Failure to do so will stifle the poten-
tial which each Act possesses to safeguard the public's environmental
interest.
might be removed from ECPA's coordination if the applicant agrees. If critical, the
long investigation might precede action on the other permits if the applicant waives
time requirements in ECPA.
124. The Wall Street Journal reported that costs of impact statements range from
$500 for a shopping mall to $9,000,000 for the Alaska pipeline. Wall Street Journal,
Sept. 27. 1973, at 1, col. 1. A Washington Department of Ecology official estimates
for us that the Addy impact statement in tentative draft cost from $18,000 to $20,000,
and that the final draft issued in October cost $15,000 to $16,000. Telephone interview
with Dennis Lundblad, Supervisor, Environmental Review Section, Department of
Ecology. Mr. Lundblad heads a section with a total of eight professional and clerical
personnel, charged with making and reviewing impact statements for the Department.
These costs do not cover costs to the project applicant and to those who oppose
the application or seek modification. Nor do they reach the critical question, whether
the impact statements significantly improved the projects, or alternatives to projects,
to which they related. Indeed, the more pertinent question even harder to answer, even
where the statement appears to have produced no result, is the influence of the
impact statement requirement on project planning and on projects abandoned before
the impact statement stage is reached.
ECPA provides that it does not affect agency charge to applicants. ECPA § 9(3),
WASH. REv. CODE § 90.62.090(3). In 1973, this was perhaps necessary, but in any
case it was, in 1973, wise. When Ecology reports to the Legislature as directed on
January 1, 1975, data should be available not only on Ecology's ECPA costs but
those of other state agencies. Regulations should now provide for submission of such
data to Ecology, including data about applicants' costs. The cost study should include
SEPA costs, because SEPA and ECPA rightfully constitute a single mechanism. This
will require, of course, a common basis of cost accounting in the regulation.
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IV. PROGNOSIS
ECPA's success or failure depends only in part on overcoming the
problems we have described. Equally important are the resources, the
personnel and the quality of its administration, not only in Ecology
but in Ecology's sister agencies. As important but harder to estimate
are responses of developers who are free to choose or to ignore ECPA,
of the public who are free to participate in or to ignore public hear-
ings, of the officials of local and of federal government whom ECPA
invites to join in coordinating environmental laws.
The biggest question is whether Ecology will succeed in executing
the directive to "provide information to the public, in readily under-
standable form, pertaining to the requirements of federal, state and
local governments for permits which must be acquired before initi-
ating various types of activities and projects proposed in the state with
special emphasis being given to those permits which apply to the use
of land, air, and water resources. '' 125 This is a large undertaking, in
125. ECPA § 12(l), WASH. REV. CODE § 90.62.120(l).
County offices staffed by clerical employees, only a part-time employee in most
counties, are to provide assistance and forms to the public. Appendix B, which is
Ecology's report of ECPA's costs to the Legislature, estimates this cost at $285,000
per year, more than twice the costs at Ecology headquarters. At headquarters, ECPA
is to be staffed by "Environmentalists" of various grades. Department of Personnel
Class Specifications for these employees are excerpted in note 132 infra. An "Environ-
mentalist" is an engineer with environmental experience and some legal expertise.
Although the junior author has an engineering background, the professional and
legal bias of both authors will be apparent in our cautiously ventured opinion that
the reported allocation of resources is heavily overweighted in clerical personnel who
will dispense assistance to the public, underweighted in the legal talent which will be
required by Ecology if the assistance to the public is to do more good than harm.
Mail and telephone-which will have to be heavily employed in any case-should
make fewer field employees necessary. The budget allocation proposed by Ecology
makes no provision for the professional legal advice which must be available to the
public if the ECPA scheme is to work. Filtered to the public through a clerical
employee in the field, legal advice is more likely to mislead than to assist. Large devel-
opers can be expected to have their own counsel; small developers and the public
invite trouble by accepting verbal assurance from clerical field personnel. Publications
to inform the public must be prepared with utmost care, because they become admin-
istrative interpretations and possibly the basis of estoppel against the state.
Although the Department of Ecology receives mail through an Olympia address, it
maintains no Olympia office. Its headquarters is in or near Lacey, on the campus of
St. Martin's College. WASH. AD. CODE § 173-02-040(2) (Supp. 10A, 1972) identifies
three regional offices: "a southwest regional office located at Olympia [reported in
fact to be in Tumwater, not Olympia], a northwest regional office located at Redmond
and an eastern regional office located at Spokane."
WASH. AD. CODE § 173-02-070 (Supp. 10A, 1972) invites submissions of applica-
tions and requests to either the Olympia address of the headquarters "or to any
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which Ecology has not been spectacularly successful even with the
programs which it now administers. For Ecology to make clear re-
quirements of all other state agencies, local governments and the
United States-as well as its own programs-is a task of unpre-
cedented proportions.
Unfortunately, Ecology's staffing proposals leave little room for
optimism. On June 28, 1973, the Department gave the Legislature its
estimate that ECPA will cost $794,533 for a biennium and a break-
down of how it proposed to spend that sum. 126 More than half would
go to clerical employees to maintain the public information operation,
including an office in each county in the state. Professional personnel
are all to be "environmentalists," a new employee classification cre-
ated in 1972 for engineers. The highest classification is Environmen-
talist V, but the highest Environmentalist administering ECPA would
be Environmentalist IV.
The Legislature appropriated $500,000,127 less than two-thirds of
the sum Ecology requested, but it provided no directions as to how
this sum will be spent.
We do not suggest that Ecology is or will be overstaffed with engi-
neers. The contrary appears to be true. 28 We do think that legal ad-
vice originating with engineers, and filtered through clerical em-
ployees in county and regional offices, is a poor way to serve the pub-
lic, the environment, or to achieve any of the stated goals of ECPA.
Ecology is now understaffed with lawyers, with the consequence
that environmentalist efforts are misdirected. A manifest example is
the Draft Environmental Impact Statement recently produced on a
proposed magnesium plant at Addy, Washington. It has received de-
served praise: "unexcelled in terms of scope, depth and clarity of pre-
sentation," and establishing "a criteria [sic] by which other impact
regional office to whose area of geographical responsibility the application, submission
or request refers" with three regional addresses. However, the Code does not define
"geographical responsibility."
126. See Appendix B infra.
127. See note 8 supra.
128. Ecology employs approximately 36 environmentalists of all grades, the
Department of Highways employs one. Telephone conversation with Ms. Cherie
Frazer, Washington Department of Personnel, Sept. 26, 1973. Figures, she advised,
vary substantially from time to time. Mr. William Wright of the same Department
advised on the same date that Environmentalists Grades III, IV and V are currently
filled only from promotional lists, i.e., engineers already employed by the state under
other labels.
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statements can be measured."' 12 9 Yet, the expensive effort is likely to
be wasted because little effort was made to identify or to appraise the
existence or adequacy of the laws which deal with the environmental
impacts. Clearly, the Addy draft statement, although expensive, was
never reviewed by any lawyer prior to its release. 130
Public participation is a theme of ECPA, but to be effective, public
participation must be more than a slogan. To participate meaning-
fully, the public must be informed accurately not only about im-
pending environmental impacts, but about the extent, nature, and
adequacy of the authority of various public officials and agencies to
deal with the particular project and the particular problem.
In the long run, if ECPA is to succeed, its administration should be
outside the Department of Ecology, in which are located most of the
activities to be coordinated. Ecology's position as the ECPA coordi-
nator and the major coordinatee is, at best, awkward. At worst, it is a
serious conflict of institutional interests.
The coordinator and expediter of ECPA must be equipped to serve
as Ecology's conscience and hair shirt, referee of Ecology's squabbles
with the Department of Natural Resources and advisor to the Legisla-
ture. The coordinator's staff should be small, augmented when needed
by technical personnel requisitioned from operating agencies. The
coordinator should have authority to fix responsibility for preparing
impact statements, and to decide what to do with them once prepared.
With respect to such statements, the coordinator should in every in-
stance identify the agency with authority to do something about such
impact, and if no such agency exists, to report that fact to the Legisla-
ture.
The coordinator should not be limited to "coordination." Constant
"coordination" usually indicates duplicating and overlapping govern-
mental functions. Responsibility should be given to recommend con-
solidation and abolition of unnecessary agencies or functions.
129. Final Environmental Impact Statement by Department of Ecology for
Proposed Northwest Alloys Magnesium Plant at Addy, Washington, August, 1973, at
87-88 (letter from Washington Office of Program Planning and Fiscal Management).
The "Final" Statement is an addendum of corrections and additions to the Draft
Statement and includes two documents, the first of 307 and the second of 442 pages.
For an estimate of the cost of both, see note 124 supra.
130. One page of the draft statement was devoted to the recent Washington
supreme court decision in Stempel, but the critical information about that decision
was quoted from an Associated Press dispatch which in turn quotes the Washington
court's opinion. See Final Addy Impact Statement, supra note 129, at 200.
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An operating agency such as Ecology cannot be expected to under-
take or to sustain such a role. To do so would embroil itself with other
agencies, bring charges of empire building, and invite retaliation from
agencies which might survive Ecology's recommendation to abolish.
Coordination, to succeed, should be carried on by an agency without
operative programs of its own and whose sole measure of performance
is the results it produces in other agencies. If ECPA is ultimately to
succeed, it will outgrow Ecology, or Ecology will absorb far larger
functions than it now has.
APPENDIX A
Letter of September 21, 1973, from Mr. Charles B. Roe, Jr., Senior
Assistant Attorney General, to Professor Charles E. Corker.
Re: Environmental Coordination Procedures Act
Dear Professor Corker:
This is written in response to your inquiries pertaining to the Envi-
ronmental Coordination Procedures Act of 1973 (ECPA) which was
recently enacted by the legislature.
As you know, I was involved in the development as well as the pas-
sage of the bill. The primary objectives of the bill were to:
1. Reduce the amount of effort required of a person or entity in
obtaining rulings on applications on permits pertaining to natural re-
sources usage or protection which are required to be approved before
a "project" is begun in the State of Washington.
2. Provide an opportunity for the "public" to present its views on a
project at one time and at one place.
3. Put state government agencies as well as certain local govern-
ment units in a position to provide more considered decisions based
on better information than allowed under other procedures.
The legislature's passage of the ECPA is a significant step in the
right direction. The step could have been substantially longer, how-
ever. Through my glasses, the bill's shortcomings relate to four major
areas:
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1. The reduction of the scope of "permits" to which the bill applies
by the addition during the bill's travels through the legislature of the
emphasized portion of section 2(4) of chapter 185, Laws of 1973,
shown as follows:
"Permit" means any license, permit, certificate, certification, ap-
proval, compliance schedule, or other similar document pertaining to
any regulatory or management program related to the protection, con-
servation, or use of, or interference with, the natural resources of land,
air or water in the state, which is required to be obtained from a state
agency prior to constructing or operating a project in the state of
Washington. Permit shall also mean a substantial development permit
under RCW 90.58.140. Nothing in this chapter shall relate to a
permit issued by the department of labor and industries or by the utili-
ties and transportation commission; nor to the granting of proprietary
interests in publicly owned property such as sales, leases, easements,
use permits and licenses.
2. The refusal of the legislature to tackle the problems arising from
the threat of multiple preparation of impact statements applicable to
one project under the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971. (It was
suggested to the legislature, but rejected, that a lead-agency concept,
such as contained in the language attached hereto, be incorporated in
the bill.)
3. The bill, as enacted, placed the "trigger" for initiating the permit
processing procedures of the act in a private party only. The bill, as
introduced at the request of Governor Evans, placed the trigger in the
Department of Ecology. The Department should have the opportunity
to force the use of the bill especially when the bill's coordinated proce-
dures would assist greatly in bringing about fully informed,
well-reasoned decisions by various governmental units.
4. The length of time involved in completing coordination proce-
dures is too long for many projects to which the statute is applicable.
It is my hope that, as time passes, the bill will be tuned up by elimi-
nating these shortcomings.
You specifically inquired as to the scope of coverage of the bill in
terms of governmental approvals. In presenting the bill to committees
of the legislature, I described the coverage as arising, in approxi-
mately 80% of the situations, from permit programs administered by
the Department of Ecology.
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The following nonexclusive list of permits issued by various agen-
cies appears to me to be covered by the act:
A. Regional Air Pollution Control Authorities
1. Air pollution source new construction approval-RCW
70.94.152
2. Air pollution standards variances-RCW 70.94.181
B. Counties
1. Substantial development permits-RCW 90.58.140
2. Forest practices permits-RCW 90.58.150
C. Department of Ecology
1. Surface water rights permits-RCW 90.03.290
2. Dam safety approval-RCW 90.03.350
3. Reservoir permits-RCW 90.03 .370
4. Approval of change of place or purpose of use-RCW
90.03.380
5. Approval of change of point of diversion-RCW 90.03.380
6. Ground water permits-RCW 90.44.050
7. Secondary permits-RCW 90.03.370
8. Air pollution source new construction approval-RCW
70.94.152
9. Air pollution standards variances-RCW 70.94.181
10. Burning permits-RCW 70.94.650
11. Flood control zone permits-RCW 86.16.080
12. Waste discharge permits-RCW 90.48.180
13. NPDES waste discharge permits-section 4, chapter 155, Laws
of 1973
14. Sewerage facilities approval-RCW 90.48.110
15. Oil discharge permit-RCW 90.48.343
16. Weather modification permit-RCW 43.37.110
D. Department of Fisheries
Hydraulic per-mit-RCW 75.20.100
E. Department of Game
Hydraulic permit-RCW 75.20.100
F. Department of Highways
Approvals to inundate public highways-RCW 90.28.010
G. Department of Natural Resources
1. Burning permit-RCW 76.04.150-.170
2. Dumping permit-RCW 76.04.242
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3. Operating permit-RCW 76.04.275
4. Right of way clearing-RCW 76.04.3 10
5. Surface mine reclamation permits-RCW 78.44.080
6. Timber cutting permits chapter 7 6.08 RCW
(The "permit" exemptions I referred to as shortcoming 1. appear to
apply to the statutory powers of the Department of Natural Resources
contained in Titles 76 and 79 RCW relating to land under that enact-
ment's jurisdiction. These powers include the authority to sell and/or
lease state-owned uplands, tidelands, shorelands and beds of navigable
waters, lease harbor areas, enter into contracts involving various types
of timber sales, exchange lands, and grant easements. The specific sta-
tutory listing of these powers is very long.)
H. Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
Drilling permit-RCW 78.52.120
I would anticipate that by mid-October 1973, the Department of
Ecology will have developed a draft of a regulation as part of the
process of satisfying the requirements of ECPA under section 11 of
chapter 185, Laws of 1973. Included in this regulation will be a more
definitive list of the permit programs covered by ECPA.
Hopefully this information will be of assistance to you.
Very truly yours,
Charles B. Roe, Jr.
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Enclosure with Roe letter
Section 12. State Environmental Policy Act [proposed but never
incorporated]:
The department shall, as to any project which appears to constitute
a major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment
for which a detailed statement is required to be prepared by RCW
43.21C.030, designate one state agency to prepare the detailed state-
ment for the project. Such statement shall accompany each permit
application processed hereunder for any project through the review
process of the state agency acting on the permit and any such agency
may append such comments of its own to the preparing agency's state-
ment as it may deem appropriate. No designation shall be made as
herein authorized if a detailed statement was prepared by local gov-
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emnment in conjunction with the issuance of a certification pursuant to
section 8 which appears to the department to satisfy the aforemen-
tioned requirements of RCW 43.21C.030. No hearing authorized
under section 5(1) shall be completed prior to completion of a detailed
statement.
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APPENDIX B
ECPA BUDGET AND PERSONNEL ALLOTMENTS
DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY OPERATING BUDGET
AND GRANT ASSISTANCE FOR COUNTIES
1974 1975
Man Years 8.0 8.0
Salaries $ 80,900 $ 85,284
Personal Service Contracts - -
Goods & Services 8,995 9,028
Travel 7,256 7,256
Equipment 2,700 1,500
Employee Benefits 10,528 11,086
DOE Annual Totals 110,379 114,154
Grants1 31  285,000 285,000
Annual Program Totals 395,379 399,154
Biennial Total $794,533
131. The $285,000 per year-more than half the total sum appropriated and more
than one-third of the total requested-is for clerical employees in each county to
make information available to the public. The information, however, does not exist
in accurate form useful to the public, and Environmentalists Grades I through IV are
unlikely to possess qualifications to produce it.
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PROGRAM PERSONNEL
Main Office 1974 1975
Environmentalist IV132  $15,840 $16,800
Environmentalist III 12,240 13,200
Clerk Typist II 6,900 7,080
Environmental Technician II 7,740 8,160"
Accounting Assistant II 7,308 7,644
Regional Offices
2 Environmentalists II 21,600 22,560
Environmentalist I 9,360 9,840
$80,988 $85,284
132. WASHINGTON STATE DEP'T OF PERSONNEL, SPECIFICATIONS FOR CLASS OF
ENVIRONMENTALIST IV (1972), sets forth the basic requirements for the supervisory
position of Environmentalist IV:
Definition: Supervises a section with statewide function of the environmental!
ecology program with major emphasis on environmental control or resource
management or supervises a defined geographical area in carrying out multiple
program responsibilities in the regional office or assists the Environmentalist
V/Division Supervisor of the department, functioning as the "assistant manager"
in program development, planning, and implementation.
Minimum Qualifications
1. A Bachelor's degree involving major study in environmental or physical
science, one of the natural sciences, engineering, or other closely allied field
(emphasis added).
AND
2. Four years of experience in environmental analysis or control. A 4Master's
degree in one of the above fields may be substituted for one year of experience.
Additional qualifying experience may be substituted, year for year, for education.
The minimum qualifications for an Environmentalist III, who "[p] lans and conducts
the work under the general direction of a Division Supervisor/ Environmentalist
IV/V and performs independently in office, laboratory or field .... " are identical to
those for Environmentalist IV, with the exception that only three, rather than four,
years of experience are required. See WASHINGTON STATE DEP'T OF PERSONNEL,
SPECIFICATIONS FOR CLASS OF ENVIRONMENTALIST III (1972).
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APPENDIX C
Corresponding step under ECPA PROCEDURE
present ECPA format.
See Part 1.
e P 1Master Application filed
with Ecology.
Request for statements of
| interest from sister agencies
[and local government].
Responses received by Ecology.9 © [Individual applications sent
to developer.
Applications filed with Ecology.
/ Ecology sends applications
to appropriate agencies
[and local government].
CNotice given for [Phase One of]
Public Hearing
[Phase One of]Public Hearing
commenced.
............. Should impact statement
be prepared?
NO YES
Negative
Declaration
filed.
Draft impact statement completed
.................. Notice given for Phase Two
of Public Hearing
Phase Two ofPublic Hearing
Final draft of impact statement
completed.
Agencies [and local government]
make final decisions on
\j7~applications.
Final decisions returned to
Ecology
~ ~ . Administrative Review
SSuperior Court Judicial Review
ECPA procedures are shown in solid lines. Dotted lines and bracketed words illustrate
consolidating ECPA procedures with SEPA, described in Part III.
